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1 Introduction
This paper argues that the explanatory power of the principal-agent model for the struc-
ture of CEO incentive pay is potentially high if CEOs are assumed to have preferences with
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), so that their risk tolerance is linear in wealth.
We show that, in a model with a lognormally distributed stock price and a CEO with this
type of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, a typical CEO compensation contract can be
approximately optimal. We begin by corroborating the finding of Hall and Murphy (2002)
and Dittmann and Maug (2007) that CEO incentive pay, which currently mostly consists of
a mix of restricted stock grants and stock-options, is inefficient if CEOs are assumed to have
preferences with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), which is a special case of HARA.
However, we show that there exists a subset of HARA utility functions such that this form
of compensation is approximately optimal. These HARA utility functions are characterized
by prudence, decreasing absolute risk aversion, and decreasing relative risk aversion, which
is consistent with the empirical evidence on individual preferences.1 The associated levels of
risk aversion and prudence are also consistent with empirical estimates. Hence, we regard
this type of HARA utility function as a plausible representation of CEO preferences. With
these preferences, the standard principal-agent model can explain reasonably well the form of
a typical CEO compensation contract.
1The assumptions of prudence and decreasing absolute risk aversion are now well-accepted and are discussed
further down. The hypothesis of decreasing relative risk aversion is more controversial, but the empirical
evidence points in this direction. Arrow (1965) shows that the wealth elasticity of investments at the risk-free
rate is smaller than unity with decreasing relative risk aversion, thus generating a testable prediction. Cohn,
Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1975) and Kessler and Wolff (1991) show that the proportion of risky
assets in household portfolios is strongly increasing in wealth, a finding corroborated by Levy (1994) in an
experimental study, and by Siegel and Hoban (1982) and Morin and Suarez (1983) for wealthy households
– although in a similar study, Blume and Friend (1975) cannot reject the hypothesis of constant relative
risk aversion. In a survey of income and consumption at the household level, Ogaki and Zhang (2001) also
conclude in favor of decreasing relative risk aversion.
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The mix of stocks and stock-options in CEO compensation is a central yet unresolved issue
in corporate governance.2 Hall and Murphy (2002), Jenter (2002), and Dittmann and Maug
(2007) demonstrate that the principal-agent model cannot explain the use of stock-options
in compensation contracts. They show that there exists a contract which would provide the
CEO with the same expected utility as a typical CEO contract and would give the same effort
incentives, but which would cost significantly less to the firm than a typical CEO contract.
Crucially, these papers assume that the stock price is lognormally distributed, that the CEO
has CRRA preferences, and that he can improve the distribution of stock returns in the sense
of first-order stochastic dominance.
These findings motivated the search for an alternative model of CEO pay which could
explain current CEO compensation contracts. Two routes are currently explored within the
principal-agent model of efficient contracting. The first consists in modifying technological
assumptions. For example, a risk averse CEO can be assumed to control the volatility of stock
returns (Feltham and Wu (2001), Dittmann and Yu (2009)). Alternatively, stock returns
can be assumed to follow a gamma distribution, as opposed to a lognormal distribution
(Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia (2000)). The second consists in relaxing the assumption of
CRRA preferences. In Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010), CEOs are assumed to be loss
averse and risk-loving in losses. With these preferences, observed CEO contracts can be
shown to be approximately optimal.3 This paper adopts a similar approach, although we
only consider concave and continuously differentiable utility functions (with no kinks). We
show that a typical CEO contract is not significantly suboptimal with properly calibrated
HARA preferences.
An alternative hypothesis is that CEO pay is inefficient, and cannot be explained by a
model of efficient contracting. For example, Yermack (1995) presents evidence in support of
2More generally, the importance of CEO incentive pay for corporate governance and corporate policies is
underlined in Jensen and Murphy (1990), Smith and Watts (1992), and Mehran (1995).
3See also de Meza and Webb (2007) for a model of optimal contracting with loss aversion.
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this hypothesis with regards to grants of stock-options, while Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue
forcefully that CEO pay is inefficient (see Weisbach (2007) for a review). However, as the
survey of Edmans and Gabaix (2009) demonstrates, recent research has proposed and tested
hypotheses which potentially reconcile the efficient contracting paradigm with the observed
characteristics of CEO pay. Most notably, Gabaix and Landier (2008) explain the rise of
levels of CEO pay over time with a matching model, while Edmans, Gabaix and Landier
(2009) explain the levels of pay-performance-sensitivities (i.e., the level of CEO incentives,
not their structure) by treating leisure as a normal good and by assuming that CEO effort has
a multiplicative effect on firm value. These results suggest that optimal contracting models
can explain important features of CEO pay. This paper contributes to this literature by
focusing on the structure of CEO incentives.
Since the form of individual preferences has not been precisely determined by the literature
so far, it is usual to consider a range of utility functions with desirable properties (a set of
“plausible” utility functions). In line with most of the literature, Hall and Murphy (2002) and
Dittmann and Maug (2007) only consider CRRA utility functions. However, it is legitimate
to relax this strong assumption, and to ask whether less stringent, potentially more accurate
preferences, enable the model to better match the data.4 This is why we consider risk-averse
and prudent HARA utility functions characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion (this
includes CRRA utility as a special case).5
We find that, with plausible CEO preferences, the difference between the cost of a typical
CEO contract and the cost of the optimal contract can be less than 1% of the cost of the former.
Furthermore, with these preferences, we find that the upside participation and the downside
4It is worth pointing out that this approach has already been applied to the equity premium puzzle. It was
addressed with preferences developed by Epstein and Zin (1989), and with the habit-formation preferences
proposed by Constantinides (1990).
5The hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion is well-established, and goes back to Pratt (1964) and
Arrow (1965). The hypothesis of prudence (Leland (1968) and Kimball (1990)) has been empirically validated
by Kraus and Litzenberger (1976), Browning and Lusardi (1996), and Gourinchas and Parker (2001).
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participation associated with the optimal contract are roughly in line with those associated
with a typical CEO compensation contract. This is in contrast with the optimal contracts
associated with CRRA preferences, which tend to feature too much downside participation
and too little upside participation relative to typically observed contracts. Finally, allowing
for HARA preferences with decreasing relative risk aversion rather than CRRA preferences
enables to capture two important features of CEO preferences which received some empirical
support, namely low and decreasing relative risk aversion (low risk aversion follows from high
wealth and decreasing relative risk aversion).
We also determine with numerical simulations how the form of the optimal contract relates
to the crucial parameters of the model. We find that the degree of convexity of the compensa-
tion profile tends to be increasing in CEO incentives, but decreasing in the level of reservation
utility and the wealth of the CEO. This generates cross-sectional predictions which provide a
good joint test of the principal-agent model for CEO pay and of the hypothesis of decreasing
relative risk aversion. We also argue that these predictions may shed some light on the shift
away from stock-options from the year 2000 documented by Frydman and Jenter (2010).
We conclude that the explanatory power of a properly calibrated principal-agent model
of efficient contracting is potentially strong. Thus, even though they may shed some light
on some aspects of CEO compensation, alternative technological assumptions or non-von
Neumann-Morgenstern preferences are not necessary for the structure of a typical CEO con-
tract to be successfully explained by the principal-agent model. More generally, our results
also provide indirect evidence in support of the hypothesis of decreasing relative risk aversion.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 calibrates a
CRRA-lognormal model to the representative CEO of Dittmann and Maug (2007). Section
4 calibrates a HARA-lognormal model to the same representative CEO, and identifies the
preference parameters for which a typical CEO contract is approximately optimal. Section 5
derives the optimal contract for a range of other parameters, and establishes some predictions.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model and the Empirical Methodology
We use the same principal-agent model as Dittmann and Maug (2007), which is standard in the
CEO compensation literature, except that we do not restrict attention to CRRA preferences,
and we let the CEO be protected by limited liability.6 Risk-neutral shareholders offer a
compensation contract to the CEO at time −1, which specifies his pay W as a function of
the stock price at time T , PT . The CEO exerts effort e at time 0, which affects firm value.
The objective of the shareholders is to implement a given level of effort e? at the minimum
cost. Thus, we take the level of incentives as given, and we focus on the form of the optimal
compensation contract which delivers this level of incentives.7
The time T stock price is assumed to be lognormally distributed. It is a function of CEO
effort, e, and of some noise:
PT (u, e) = f(e) exp
{(
rf − σ
2
2
)
T + u
√
Tσ
}
(1)
where u˜ is the standard normal variable, rf is the risk-free interest rate, σ is the stock price
volatility, and f(e) is an increasing and concave function of e. Thus, CEO effort affects
the probability distribution of the time T stock price in the sense of first-order stochastic
6Dittmann and Maug assume that the contract could force the CEO to give up his preexisting wealth,
so that his end-of-period wealth is only equal to his contractual payment. First, such a mechanism is rarely
observed in practice. Second, it is common in principal-agent models to assume limited liability. Third, we
need the CEO to have a minimum level of wealth in all states of the world to calibrate the HARA utility
function in section IV of the paper. Fourth, imposing this constraint allows us to verify that Dittmann and
Maug’s results are not driven by the absence of a limited liability constraint for the CEO. Since limited liability
implies a higher lower bound on payments, it is possible that it would make the optimal contract more convex:
roughly speaking, since it is may not be possible to provide adequate incentives with sticks, carrots may be
used instead. This being said, as the analysis that follows will show, the main results of Dittmann and Maug
are robust to the inclusion of a limited liability constraint.
7More precisely, we only consider the first step of optimal contracting in Grossman and Hart (1983), which
consists in minimizing the agency cost of implementing a given effort e?. Any optimal contract is a solution
to the first step problem, for a given level of effort.
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dominance.
The CEO’s wealth at time T consists of his preexisting wealth ω capitalized for T years
at the risk-free rate of interest, and his contractual payment W (PT ). To alleviate notations,
we define ωˆ ≡ ω exp{rfT}. The CEO’s objective function is additively separable in wealth
and effort cost and is given by
U(ωˆ +W (PT ))− C(e) (2)
The utility function U is characterized by U ′(W ) > 0, U ′′(W ) < 0, U ′′′(W ) > 0, and by
decreasing absolute risk aversion. The function C(e), which measures the future value of the
cost of effort, is increasing and convex in e.
The incentive constraint guarantees that e? maximizes the CEO’s objective function given
his contract. Using the first-order approach,8 it reduces to
E[W ′(P˜T )U ′(ωˆ +W (P˜T ))] =
C ′(e?)
f ′(e?)
(3)
A contract that satisfies this constraint is said to be incentive-compatible. Notice that the
right-hand-side of (3) is increasing in e?.
The CEO’s outside option gives him an expected utility net of effort cost of U¯ . The
contract offer therefore satisfies the CEO’s participation constraint at the equilibrium level of
effort, and the contract is said to be individually rational, if and only if, in equilibrium,
E[U(ωˆ +W (P˜T ))] ≥ U¯ + C(e?) (4)
Finally, we let the CEO be protected by limited liability, so that negative payments are
8For any given contract W such that the second derivative of E
[
U(W (P˜T ))
]
with respect to e is finite,
there exists a sufficiently convex cost function such that the first-order approach is valid. Put differently, the
set of contracts for which the first-order approach is valid can be enlarged as needed by increasing C ′′(e), i.e.,
by increasing the convexity of the cost function. Since in this paper we consider given contracts, it is always
possible to ensure that the first-order approach holds in each case. Dittmann, Maug and Spalt (2010) use the
same argument. Admittedly, this approach would not be appropriate for selecting the most efficient contract
in an unbounded set of contracts.
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not feasible.
W (PT ) ≥ 0 for any PT (5)
The cost of a contract is defined as its expected payoff in equilibrium. The problem of
the shareholders is to minimize the cost of implementing effort e? subject to the incentive
constraint, the participation constraint, and the limited liability constraint:
min
W (PT )
E[W (P˜T )] s.t. (3), (4), and (5). (6)
We follow the same empirical methodology as Dittmann and Maug (2007), and we use
their “representative CEO” to facilitate comparability. More details on the methodology can
be found in Dittmann, Zhang, Maug, and Spalt (2011).
First, for each utility function considered, we derive the form of the optimal compensation
contract, as explained in the Appendix. It gives the optimal mapping from the end-of-period
stock price PT to the payment W to the CEO as a function of two parameters, α0 and α1.
Second, for each utility function considered, we set the contract parameters α0 and α1 such
that the optimal contract (denoted by WO) is individually rational and incentive-compatible,
in the sense that it gives the CEO the same expected utility and induces the same level of
effort as the observed contract (denoted by WD):
E[U(ωˆ +WO(P˜T ))] = E[U(ωˆ +WD(P˜T ))] (7)
E[W ′O(P˜T )U
′(ωˆ +WO(P˜T ))] = E[W ′D(P˜T )U
′(ωˆ +WD(P˜T ))] (8)
Third, for each utility function considered, we compute the difference between the cost of
the observed contract and the cost of the optimal contract whose parameters were determined
in the second step. Since by definition the optimal contract minimizes the cost of CEO pay,
the model’s explanatory power is high if and only if this (positive) difference is relatively
small.
The rest of the paper successively applies this methodology to CRRA and HARA utility
functions.
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3 CRRA Preferences
In this section, we assume CRRA preferences with positive coefficient of relative risk aversion
γ:
U(W ) =
W 1−γ
1− γ (9)
for γ 6= 1 and
U(W ) = ln(W ) (10)
for γ = 1.
The CRRA-lognormal setting is commonly used in models of executive compensation.9
Admittedly, the CRRA utility function exhibits desirable properties, such as risk aversion,
prudence, and decreasing absolute risk aversion. The purpose of this section is to show
that the explanatory power of the principal-agent model is unsatisfactorily low when CRRA
preferences with plausible values of relative risk aversion are postulated. However, we also
emphasize that the explanatory power of the principal-agent model largely depends on the
postulated value of relative risk aversion, which suggests that CEO preferences are crucial,
and should be chosen carefully.
Dittmann and Maug (2007) acknowledge that there is no consensus regarding the value of
the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. For values of γ between 0.5 and 10, they show that
switching from the observed CEO contracts to the optimal contracts would generate large
cost savings. This implies that, for any of these preference parameters, the model fails to
explain the data.
We apply the aforementioned three steps approach to the representative CEO of Dittmann
and Maug with CRRA utility. Results are reported in Figure 1 for selected values of γ,
including γ = 0.1.
As Dittmann and Maug (2007), we find that the potential savings associated with a
9Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy (2000, 2002), Hall and Knox (2004), Jenter
(2002), Lambert and Larcker (2004), Dittmann and Maug (2007), Dittmann and Yu (2009).
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Figure 1: The observed CEO compensation contract, and optimal compensation contracts for
different coefficients of RRA.
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switch to the optimal contract are monotonically increasing in γ, and become so low as to
be economically insignificant for very low values of γ. For example, potential savings are
1.7% with γ = 0.1, 10.0% with γ = 0.5, 18.8% with γ = 1, and 32.9% with γ = 2. With
CRRA utility, an implausibly low coefficient of relative risk aversion is needed for the observed
contract to be approximately efficient. The findings of the next section will shed light on this
puzzle.
Arguably, the optimal contract with low values of γ could be approximately optimal be-
cause all contracts are approximately optimal for low values of γ. This is not the case: the
cost of certain contracts remains relatively high even for low values of γ. For example, for
γ = 0.1, an individually rational and incentive-compatible stock-option-like contract with
at-the-money call options and a fixed wage may be derived. It costs 5.0% more to the firm
than the optimal contract. This example shows that not all contracts which satisfy the par-
ticipation constraint and the incentive constraint are associated with low potential savings
for low coefficients of relative risk aversion.
4 HARA Preferences
While CRRA preferences have desirable properties, the hypothesis of constant relative risk
aversion is strong, and rules out a large set of plausible utility functions. In addition, we
have shown in the preceding section that the performance of the principal-agent model is
very sensitive to the postulated value of relative risk aversion, which suggests that it may
also be sensitive to the postulated functional form for the utility function. Consequently,
we now relax the assumption of constant relative risk aversion, and use HARA preferences
instead. We are going to show that this markedly improves the explanatory power of the
11
principal-agent model.10
A HARA utility function is defined by its parameters a and b, and takes the form:11
U(W ) =
(
a+
W
b
)1−b
(11)
where b 6= 0 and W ≥ 0. Its coefficient of relative risk aversion is
R(W ) = W
(
a+
W
b
)−1
(12)
Relative risk aversion is decreasing in wealth if and only if a is negative, whereas it is constant
if a = 0. To ensure that our assumptions that U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, U ′′′ > 0 and decreasing absolute
risk aversion are satisfied, we must impose the conditions that 0 < b < 1 and W > −ab. We
refer to the preference parameters a and b which satisfy these restrictions as “eligible”.
We apply the aforementioned three steps approach to the representative CEO of Dittmann
and Maug with HARA utility and eligible preference parameters. Potential savings associated
with a switch to the optimal contract are reported in Table 1, for a range of values of a and
b.12 In addition, for b = 0.25 and a = −3.9, potential savings amount to 4.9% of the cost
of compensation of the representative CEO; for b = 0.1 and a = −1.85, potential savings
are only 0.96%.13 Thus, there exists some eligible preference parameters a and b such that
10Rabin (2000) emphasizes that the attitude toward risk represented by a utility function may only apply
to risks of a certain (adequate) “size”, and that it may not accurately represent the attitude toward risks of
an altogether different size. Here we are only concerned about the risk preferences of CEOs as they relate to
their level of pay.
11More complex specifications could alternatively be used. This one is the simplest for our purposes.
12For a given value of b, the algorithm does not converge when a is too low. The lower b is, the higher the
lower bound for a is. This explains the NA values in the table. For some values of b, we hereafter report
the potential savings when a takes the lowest possible value such that the algorithm converges. Notice that
potential savings, as reported above in the CRRA case and in Table 1 for the HARA case, differ for a = 0,
when the values of γ and b coincide. This is because, even though such utility functions share the same relative
risk aversion, their forms nevertheless differ, as can easily be seen by comparing (9) to (11) with a = 0.
13Preference parameters in a neighborhood of these points tend to be associated with similar potential
savings.
12
the difference between the cost of the observed contract and the cost of the optimal contract
is less than 1% of the cost of the observed contract. This indicates that the principal-agent
model with HARA preferences can be calibrated in such a way that a typical CEO contract
is not significantly inefficient.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Holding a constant, Table 1 suggests that potential savings are an increasing function of
b. We already obtained this result in the CRRA case (with a = 0), but it seems to hold
more generally for any value of a. The suboptimality of the observed contract is therefore
minimized for very low values of b. On the contrary, the model performs poorly for higher
values of b: potential savings then remain large for any value of a.
For low values of b, savings are an increasing function of a. For b = 0.1 (respectively
b = 0.25), assuming that a = −1.85 (respectively a = −3.9) instead of relying on the hypoth-
esis of constant relative risk aversion (a = 0) reduces potential savings by 59% (respectively
15%). Postulating a decreasing relative risk aversion (a negative a) significantly reduces the
inefficiency of the observed contract. In addition, as shown in Figure 2 and Table 2, it makes
the optimal contract less concave than with constant relative risk aversion, thus reducing the
difference in curvature between the optimal contract and the observed contract. For example,
for a = −1.85 and b = 0.1, the optimal payment increases by 102% if the realized stock
price is one standard deviation above the mean (against 130% for the observed contract),
whereas it increases by only 52% with the hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion (a = 0,
b = 0.1). In sum, having preferences with decreasing relative risk aversion (a < 0) in addition
to decreasing absolute risk aversion (b > 0) significantly improves the explanatory power of
the model.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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Figure 2: The observed CEO compensation contract, and optimal compensation contracts for
different preference parameters.
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Admittedly, the inefficiency of the observed contract relative to the optimal contract could
be minimized simply because any contract will be approximately optimal when the risk aver-
sion of the agent is sufficiently low. There are two answers to this argument. The first is
that inefficient contracts remain significantly more costly than the optimal contract even at
low levels of risk aversion, as already noted in the last paragraph of the previous section.
The second answer is that the preference parameters which minimize the suboptimality of the
observed contract also generate an optimal contract which closely resembles a typical CEO
compensation contract, as can be seen in Figure 2. This is in contrast to the optimal contracts
generated by the model with other preference parameters (see Figures 1 and 3 for examples).
More precisely, we compute in Table 2 some measures of upside participation and downside
participation associated with the observed contract and the optimal contract, for a range of
preference parameters. We can see that these two measures tend to differ widely, with an
optimal contract generally characterized by too much downside participation and too little
upside participation relative to the observed contract. However, in the case of a low b and
a negative a, the downside participation and upside participation of the optimal contract
is roughly comparable to the observed contract’s. Moreover, for a given low b, having a
negative a (decreasing relative risk aversion) instead of a zero a (constant relative risk aversion)
markedly improves the fit of the model on this dimension, by almost doubling the upside
participation of the optimal contract. Intuitively, this is because the hypothesis of decreasing
relative risk aversion tends to reduce the concavity of the utility function for high payments,
which reduces the discounting associated with high payments. This in turn makes it more
desirable to use rewards (high payments for superior performance) for incentive purposes.
Because of the restrictions imposed on the utility function, we know that the HARA utility
functions considered have plausible qualitative properties, namely risk aversion, prudence, and
decreasing absolute risk aversion. The property of decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA)
associated with a < 0 is more controversial, but there is some evidence that relative risk
aversion is indeed decreasing with wealth. Arrow (1965) shows that the wealth elasticity of
15
investments at the risk-free rate is smaller than unity with DRRA. The empirical evidence
points in this direction: Cohn, Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1975) and Kessler and Wolff
(1991) show that the proportion of risky assets in household portfolios is strongly increasing in
wealth, a finding corroborated by Levy (1994) in an experimental study, and Siegel and Hoban
(1982) for wealthy households – although in a similar study, Blume and Friend (1975) cannot
reject the hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion. In a survey of income and consumption
at the household level, Ogaki and Zhang (2001) also conclude in favor of DRRA.
We now argue that the HARA utility functions that we have identified as having a high
explanatory power also have plausible quantitative properties, in the sense that they tend to
generate plausible values of relative risk aversion – we address prudence in the next paragraph.
With a = −1.85 and b = 0.1, a CEO with a wealth of $0.2m would have a relative risk aversion
of 1.33,14 while a CEO with a wealth of $10m or more would have a relative risk aversion of
0.1.15 Thus, the hypothesis of decreasing relative risk aversion may not only yield plausible
values of relative risk aversion for individuals with more common levels of wealth,16 but
also low values of relative risk aversion for wealthy CEOs. This is in line with the finding
of Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2009) that CEOs tend to be significantly less averse to a
14The coefficient of relative risk aversion would be even higher for poorer households. However, the utility
function associated with these values of a and b is only defined for W ≥ $0.185m. According to the 2009
Survey of Consumer Finances, the mean (respectively median) U.S. household had a net worth of $0.56m
(resp. $0.12m) in 2007.
15The coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 0.102 at the representative CEO preexisting wealth
level of $9.1m, and it converges toward 0.1 as wealth tends to infinity.
16Kydland and Prescott (1982) need a relative risk aversion between 1 and 2 to replicate the observed fluc-
tuations in consumption and investment. In a model of consumption behavior over the life cycle, Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) estimate that the coefficient of relative risk aversion of households is between 0.5 and 1.4.
Epstein and Zin (1991) estimate that relative risk aversion is around one, and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay
(1997), as well as Ait-Sahalia and Lo (2000) summarize estimates obtained in the macroeconomic literature.
In experiments, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom (2007) obtain an average value of relative risk aversion of 0.67,
while Bombardini and Trebbi (2007) obtain an average value of 1. The latter also review the experimental
literature.
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multiplicative risk than the average individual, which implies that they have lower relative
risk aversion.17
Lastly, even though the HARA utility that we consider is markedly less risk averse than a
CRRA utility for a range of commonly used values of γ, it is not much less prudent. Indeed,
the coefficient of absolute prudence, which measures the extent of prudence at a given level
of wealth w (Kimball (1990)) is equal to γ+1
w
in the case of CRRA utility, and to b+1
ab+w
in the
case of HARA utility. In a study of precautionary savings, Gourinchas and Parker (2001)
use CRRA utility and find that a coefficient of relative risk aversion γ of 0.51 best matches
the data. When we compare the associated coefficient of absolute prudence with the one
associated with the HARA utility function that we use, we find that they differ by less than
27% for any level of wealth larger than 0.5m (the difference is only 16% for a wealth of 0.5m).
Thus, the degree of prudence implied by our utility function does not seem to differ much
from empirical estimates.18
Results in Table 1 highlight that the explanatory power of the model is sensitive to the
parameterization of the CEO utility function. This emphasizes the importance of the cal-
ibration of CEO preferences. This also explains why simplifying assumptions like constant
relative risk aversion may seriously undermine the performance of the model. Finally, if rel-
ative risk aversion is indeed decreasing with wealth, calibrating a misspecified model with
CRRA preferences to the data will yield a very low implied coefficient of relative risk aversion
17This result alone suggests either that CRRA preferences do not accurately represent individual preferences,
or that CEOs are intrinsically (for any level of wealth) less risk averse than the general population, possibly
because of a selection effect. This latter hypothesis is plausible, since there is evidence that risk preferences
are heterogeneous across the population (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997)). However, we have
argued above that postulating that relative risk aversion is not only low (for high levels of wealth) but also
decreasing significantly improves the explanatory power of the model.
18Dynan (1993) finds that the coefficient of relative prudence (which is equal to γ + 1 with CRRA utility)
that best explains precautionary savings is less than one, which is admittedly puzzling. It may also suggest
that consumers are not as prudent as a calibration of CRRA utility with a range of commonly accepted values
for γ would suggest, which is consistent with our findings.
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for wealthy individuals (including CEOs), and a very high implied coefficient of relative risk
aversion for poor individuals. This would in turn explain why the coefficient of relative risk
aversion which best fits the data is implausibly low in the CRRA-lognormal model.
Even though HARA utility may allow for a significantly better representation of CEO
preferences than CRRA utility, it should be stressed that it is not a perfect representation
either. First of all because two parameters cannot generate any “plausible” utility function.
But also because it is possible and even likely that different CEOs have at least slightly
different preferences, so that they will not share exactly the same utility function. The
preference parameters that we have derived for the representative CEO should be considered
with this caveat in mind. The main point of this section of the paper is that relaxing the
hypothesis of CRRA preferences, and in particular postulating a low and decreasing relative
risk aversion, can significantly increase the explanatory power of the principal-agent model
for CEO incentive pay.
5 Robustness and predictions
Our approach works well for the representative, “median” CEO, but one limitation is that it
cannot be readily extended to a sample of CEOs. This is because the preference parameters
that we infer in section 4 for the representative CEO of Dittmann and Maug (2007) are a
corner solution: the algorithm does not converge, so that the optimal contract cannot be
derived, for a lower a and/or a lower b. The corner solution for a and b is obtained for the
parameter values of the representative CEO. For other parameter values, the algorithm will
converge in some cases, and not converge in other cases. Therefore, even if the model had a
good explanatory power with the derived preference parameters for about one half of CEOs,
say, it would be impossible to know whether or not the model fits the data – all the more
that this set of CEOs would not be representative.
Another limitation of the calibration to a sample of CEOs is that neither the wealth nor
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the portfolio of stock-options of the CEOs are observed per se – only estimates or proxies
are available. This limitation does not matter much in Dittmann and Maug (2007), precisely
because they find that the explanatory power of the principal-agent model with CRRA pref-
erences is low for most parameter values. It does not matter much in Dittmann, Maug and
Spalt (2010) either, because the convexity of CEO pay in this paper is primarily generated
by the combination of loss aversion and a convex utility function for levels of wealth below
the reference point. That is, their result that the optimal contract is convex on some interval
is not very sensitive to parameter values. In our model with HARA preferences, however, the
degree of convexity of the optimal contract is quite sensitive to parameter values.19 In this
case, the unobservability of the wealth and stock-options portfolios of the CEOs become a
significant issue.
For these two reasons, we adopt an alternative, indirect approach. With the Dittmann and
Maug (2007) methodology that we use, the only effect of any given observed CEO contract is
to determine the right-hand-sides of (3) and (4), respectively the incentive constraint and the
participation constraint. In addition, given some CEO preferences, the right-hand-sides of (3)
and (4) and the level of wealth of the CEO are the only three relevant parameters for the form
of the optimal contract. Indeed, the optimal contract is derived in the Appendix, as a function
of two parameters, α0 and α1, which are set to match the participation constraint and the
incentive constraint of the CEO. Hence the following approach: given the CEO preference
already derived in section 4, we compute the optimal contract for a range of values of these
three crucial parameters. This enables us to at least partly address not only the effect of
heterogeneity among CEOs on the form of the optimal contract, but also the changes in the
structure of CEO incentive pay over time, and to establish predictions relating the form of
the optimal contract to these three parameters.
First of all, leaving the wealth of the representative CEO unchanged, we compute the
19The sensitivity to preference parameters is illustrated in section 4. In this section, we will illustrate the
sensitivity to other relevant parameters.
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optimal contract for a level of incentives which is equal to its baseline level (i.e., for the
representative CEO), to half this baseline level, and to twice this baseline level, and for a
reservation utility which equal to its baseline level, to 75% of this baseline level (the algorithm
does not converge at 50%), and to twice this baseline level. Next, we repeat this procedure
for a level of wealth which is half the baseline level, and for a level of wealth which is equal
to twice the baseline level. Results are reported in Figures 3, 4, and 5.
As expected given the corner solution limitation mentioned above, the algorithm does not
converge in a number of cases, but these Figures nevertheless suggest certain relationships.
First, for a given level of wealth and reservation utility, the degree of convexity of CEO
compensation seems to be increasing in the level of CEO incentives. Second, for a given level
of wealth and of CEO incentives, the degree of convexity of CEO compensation seems to be
decreasing in the reservation utility of the CEO. Third, for a given reservation utility and
a given level of CEO incentives, the degree of convexity of CEO compensation seems to be
decreasing in the level of CEO wealth. These relationships in turn suggest some predictions,
which we describe below. Whether or not these predictions are verified in the data provides
a good test of the joint hypothesis of HARA utility with the preference parameters derived
in section 4 and of the standard model of CEO compensation of Hall and Murphy (2002) and
Dittmann and Maug (2007).
We start with cross-sectional predictions. First, for a given level of wealth and reservation
utility, CEOs who receive more incentives will tend to hold relatively more options than
stocks. Thus, all else equal, the model predicts a positive relationship between the level of
equity incentives and the convexity of the incentive package. This is consistent with the
positive correlation between the mix of stock-options in CEO pay and the intensity of CEO
equity incentives reported in Bryan, Hwang, and Lilien (2000). Second, CEOs with a higher
reservation utility (which can be proxied by the total pay of the CEO in a given year) will
tend to receive less convex compensation packages, i.e., they will hold relatively more stocks
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Figure 3: The observed CEO compensation contract, and the optimal compensation contract
with HARA utility for a = −1.85 and b = 0.1, for different levels of incentives and reservation
utility. The central figure is the same as Figure 2. Upward, reservation utility is 100% higher.
Downward, reservation utility is 25% lower. Leftward, incentives are 50% lower. Rightward,
incentives are 100% higher.
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Figure 4: The observed CEO compensation contract, and the optimal compensation contract
with HARA utility for a = −1.85 and b = 0.1, for different levels of incentives and reservation
utility, and a level of wealth 50% lower than in Figure 2. The (missing) central figure has
the same levels of incentives and reservation utility as Figure 2. Upward, reservation utility
is 100% higher. Downward, reservation utility is 25% lower. Leftward, incentives are 50%
lower. Rightward, incentives are 100% higher.
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Figure 5: The observed CEO compensation contract, and the optimal compensation contract
with HARA utility for a = −1.85 and b = 0.1, for different levels of incentives and reservation
utility, and a level of wealth 100% higher than in Figure 2. The central figure has the same
levels of incentives and reservation utility as Figure 2. Upward, reservation utility is 100%
higher. Downward, reservation utility is 25% lower. Leftward, incentives are 50% lower.
Rightward, incentives are 100% higher. Notice the change of scale on the y axis for the first
row.
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than options, ceteris paribus. Third, proxies for wealth,20 such as age, should be negatively
correlated with the degree of convexity of CEO compensation, ceteris paribus. Given current
compensation practices, the degree of convexity can be measured by the ratio of options-to-
stocks held by the CEO – as adjusted for the fact that stock-options granted in previous
years are typically not at-the-money anymore. That is, the equity participation of young,
less wealthy CEOs should be more in the form of options than the equity participation of
old, more wealthy CEOs. This is consistent with the findings of Ryan and Wiggins (2001)
that the percentage of stock-options in CEO compensation is decreasing in proxies for CEO
wealth such as CEO tenure, CEO age, and CEO stock ownership. Still, more research would
be needed to specifically test these predictions.
Using a taxonomy which is popular in the industrial organization literature (Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984)), we may also say that the model suggests the following predictions.21
“Lean and hungry” CEOs, i.e. those with high incentives, low pay and low wealth, have the
most convex compensation schedules, with lots of stock-options. “Puppy dogs”, i.e., CEOs
with low incentives, low pay and low wealth, have a less convex compensation, which consists
of both stocks and stock-options. “Tog dogs”, i.e., CEOs with high incentives, high pay
and high wealth, have an even less convex compensation, which consists primarily of stocks.
Finally, the model does not explain the equity-based compensation of “fat cats”, i.e., CEOs
with low incentives, high pay and high wealth, since their compensation should typically be
a concave function of their performance. An alternatively view is that the model predicts
that the incentives for this latter type of CEOs will not be primarily provided in the form of
stocks and stock-options, but instead with long-term incentive payments and bonuses.22 More
20Data on the wealth of American CEOs is not publicly available.
21It should be noted that we do not ascribe the same meanings to those terms as Fudenberg and Tirole
(1984).
22This is arguably consistent with the finding of Ryan and Wiggins (2001) that the proportion of CEO pay
in the form of bonuses is increasing and concave in CEO age. Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) also find
that equity-based compensation decreases with tenure, but that the share of bonuses in CEO compensation
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precisely, bonuses will be largely insensitive to firm performance as long as stock returns are
not too low, but will be cut in the event of very low stock returns (cf. the graph on the top
left corner of Figure 5 in this paper, which looks very much like a typical bonus plan with a
low performance threshold, as displayed in Figure 5 in Murphy (1999)). This could explain
the empirical fact that bonuses are typically only paid if performance exceeds a threshold,
and that they are capped (Murphy (1999)).
We may also analyze the changes in the structure of CEO compensation over time in the
light of these predictions. It is well-known (Frydman and Jenter (2010)) that the structure
of CEO compensation varies a lot over time. In particular, from 1950 to 2000, the equity
incentives and the pay of S&P 500 CEOs have risen tremendously, which suggests that CEO
wealth has also increased over the period. Whereas the rise in incentives suggests an increase
in the convexity of CEO compensation, the rise in pay and in wealth suggest a decrease in
convexity. Given our predictions, the fact that options progressively became more important
than stocks over the period23 can only be explained by the rise in CEO incentives, which must
have outweighed the other two factors.
On the contrary, from 2000 to 2008, the data indicates that S&P 500 CEOs received
slightly less incentives.24 In addition, their pay tended to remain approximately at the high
level reached in 2000 (Frydman and Jenter (2010)). Since CEO pay increased markedly
in the 1900s, and because stock returns have mostly been positive for big companies from
2000 to 2008, this in turn suggests that average CEO wealth increased at least slightly from
increases with tenure.
23Frydman and Jenter (2010) document that large US firms gave small but roughly similar amounts of
stocks and options in the 1950s and the 1960s. Options then progressively became more popular relative to
stocks in the 1970s, the 1980s, and in the late 1990s. In 2000, 49% of CEO pay consisted of options, while
only 7% consisted of stocks in S&P 500 companies.
24This is true whether the Jensen and Murphy (1990) or the Hall and Liebman (1998) statistic is used. The
first is the dollar change in CEO wealth per dollar change in firm value. The second is the dollar change in
CEO wealth per percent change in firm value. This is also true if we adjust for utility: to the extent that
CEO wealth increases over the period, the decrease in CEO incentives is then even more pronounced.
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2000 to 2008. Given these two changes – lower incentives and higher CEO wealth – the model
unambiguously predicts a diminution in the convexity of CEO compensation. This is precisely
what happened. Whether average CEO pay was 49% options and 7% stocks in 2000, it was
25% options and 32% stocks in 2008. While not conclusive, this change is at least consistent
with the model’s predictions.
6 Conclusion
The explanatory power of the principal-agent model for the structure of CEO incentive pay
largely depends on the postulated utility of wealth. While the hypothesis of CRRA preferences
cannot explain the form of CEO incentive pay for plausible values of relative risk aversion
(Dittmann and Maug (2007)), we have shown that there exists some HARA utility functions
whose explanatory power can be high. More specifically, we have identified preference param-
eters such that the cost difference between a typical CEO contract and the optimal contract
is less than 1% of CEO pay, and the optimal contract thus derived looks similar to a typical
CEO contract. This can be achieved with a utility function which is risk averse, prudent,
characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing relative risk aversion. The
hypothesis of decreasing relative risk aversion can also explain why wealthy CEOs tend to
have a low relative risk aversion (Graham, Harvey and Puri (2010)).
This paper does not argue that CEOs have a specific set of preferences that may be
inferred from the observation of their compensation contract, if only because the assumption
of HARA utility obviously remains quite restrictive. However, we have shown that relaxing
the hypothesis of CRRA preferences enables to markedly improve the explanatory power of a
standard version of the principal-agent model notably used by Hall and Murphy (2002) and
Dittmann and Maug (2007). Given that the principal-agent model of efficient contracting
has a high explanatory power for the structure of CEO incentive pay for some plausible CEO
preferences, it is not clear that this model should be rejected.
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7 Appendix
Let ϕ be the p.d.f. of PT . The Holmstrom (1979) condition below describes the optimal
contract W (PT ) when the principal is risk-neutral and the first-order approach applies:
1
u′(ωˆ +W (PT ))
= λ+ µ
ϕe(PT )
ϕ(PT )
(13)
where λ and µ are the Lagrange multipliers on the participation constraint and the incentive
constraint, respectively. With CRRA utility, using (13), the optimal contract takes the form:
W (PT ) =

(α0 + α1ln(PT ))
1
γ − ωˆ if PT ≥ P¯T
0 if PT < P¯T
where P¯T ≡ exp{ ωˆγ−α0α1 }, α0 and α1 are two constants which are determined to satisfy the
participation constraint and the incentive constraint.
Likewise, with HARA utility, the optimal contract takes the form:
W (PT ) =

1
b
(
1−b
b
(α0 + α1ln(PT ))
1
b − a
)
− ωˆ if PT ≥ P¯T
0 if PT < P¯T
where P¯T ≡ exp
{
1
α1
(
b
1−b(a+ bωˆ)
b − α0
)}
.
The “representative CEO” of Dittmann and Maug has a fixed wage of $1.2m, is endowed
with 0.42% of his company’s equity and 0.50% in stock-options, and has an initial wealth
unrelated to his company of 9.1m. The market value of equity of his company is $3.7bn, the
options’ exercise price amounts to 63% of the time 0 stock price, T is 8.5 years, the volatility
is 33.5%, and the risk-free rate is 6.6%. We use the same data to facilitate comparability.
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 7DEOH
3RWHQWLDOFRVWVDYLQJVIRUDUDQJHRISUHIHUHQFHSDUDPHWHUV
This table reports the cost savings associated with a switch to the optimal contract in the HARA-lognormal model, as 
a percentage of the cost of the actual contract of the representative CEO. Results are reported for a range of values of 
a and b, the parameters of a HARA utility function. In addition, for E= 0.25 and D= -3.9, potential savings amount 
to 4.9% of the cost of compensation of the representative CEO. For E= 0.1 and D = -1.85, potential savings are only 
0.96%. 
 
 
 
 
7DEOH
7KHVKDSHRIGLIIHUHQWFRQWUDFWVLQWKH+$5$ORJQRUPDOPRGHO
This table reports the change in the wealth of the representative CEO for a given value of the stock price 3   with 
respect to his wealth at the median of the distribution. For any given contract, the end-of-period wealth is calculated 
as the initial wealth capitalized at the risk-free rate of interest for 7 years plus any contractual payment. The median 
stock price is 3   (0,H*). The four columns correspond respectively to X = -2, -1, 1, 2. Results are reported for five 
different contracts, including the contract of the representative CEO (‘‘observed contract’’) and nine optimal 
contracts for different values of D and E, the parameters of a HARA utility function.   
 
 
 
 
E
0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90
-10 NA NA NA 21.69% 21.80%
-5 NA NA 10.04% 15.57% 18.70%
-1 2.13% 5.57% 10.00% 14.68% 17.21%
0 2.34% 5.71% 9.99% 14.86% 18.43%
1 2.42% 5.77% 9.83% 14.97% 17.94%
10 2.58% 5.83% 9.47% 13.63% 16.53%
D
3  (-2,H *) 3  (-1,H *) 3  (1,H *) 3  (2,H *)
Observed contract -54% -44% 130% 467%
Optimal contract, b=0.1, a=-1.85 -56% -41% 102% 335%
Optimal contract, b=0.1, a=0 -60% -36% 52% 128%
Optimal contract, b=0.1, a=10 -61% -33% 37% 78%
Optimal contract, b=0.5, a=-5 -61% -36% 46% 101%
Optimal contract, b=0.5, a=0 -62% -35% 42% 90%
Optimal contract, b=0.5, a=10 -63% -34% 38% 81%
Optimal contract, b=0.9, a=-10 -60% -31% 32% 65%
Optimal contract, b=0.9, a=0 -62% -32% 32% 66%
Optimal contract, b=0.9, a=10 -63% -32% 33% 66%
Change in the wealth of the representative CEO 
with respect to his wealth at the median stock 
price 3  (0,H *) if the stock price is
